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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
HOWARD C. TEAGUE,
Plaintiff,

vs.
THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN
AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, and MILTON
C. BRANDON,
Defendants.

Case No. 8232

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an orig)inal proceeding by which Howard
Teague seeks an Order of this Court under the provisions of Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
permanently prohibiting the defendant District Court
from proceeding with the case now pending in that
court, entitled Milton C. Brandon, Plaintiff, vs. Howard
C. Teagvue, Defendant, Civil No. 99973. A extraordinary
writ in the nature of an alternative writ of pr~ohibition
was issued by this Court on July 21, 1954, for the purpose of allowing this Court to inquire into the matter.
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The ground upon which Teague seeks to have the
alternative writ made permanent is that the defendant
District Court has assumed to act "Tithout and in excess
of its jurisdiction, since Teague was not personally
served with process, and the only process against him
was that served upon the Secretary of State under the
provisions of the statute known as the Non-Resident
Motorist Act, 41-12-8, U.C.A., 1953. Teague claims he
was not a "non-resident motorist" within the meaning
of that Act.
For the convenience of the Court, and to avoid
confusion, the parties '"ill be designated by name.
On October 2, 1953, Brandon, a resident of Everett,
Washingjton, filed his complaint against Teague in the
District Court of Salt Lake County. He alleged that
Teague "is a non-resident of the State of Utah" ( emphasis ours). He claimed further that on August 8, 1952
he was riding in a car being driven by Teague in Salt
Lake County, and that he sustained injuries in an accident which resulted from Teague's willful misconduct.
(R. 3, 4).
On October 2, 1953, a summons and a copy of the
complaint 'Were filed with the Secretary of State of
Utah (R. 11), in an attempt to serve Teague under the
provisions of Chapter 41-12-8, U.C.A., 1953. The pertinent portions of this statute are as follows:
"The use and operation by a nonresident or
his agent of a motor vehicle upon and over the
highways of the state of Utah shall be deemed
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an appointineut by such nonresident of the secretary of state of the state of Utah, to be his
true and lawful attorney upon whom may be
served all legal processes in any action or proceeding against him g1rowing out of such use or
operation of a motor vehicle over the highways
of this state resulting in damages or loss to person or property and said use or operation shall be
a signification of his agreement that any such
pi"ocess shall, in any action against him which is
so served, be of the same legal force and validity
as if served upon him personally . . . ''
Brandon's counsel, by affidavit dated October 2,
1953, stated he had mailed, on October 1, 1953, by registered mail, a copy of the complaint and smnmons to
Teague at his last known address : '' Deseret Chemical
Depot, Tooele County, Utah" (R. 6). Included with the
summons and complaint, according to the affidavit, was
a notice to defendant of the purported service upon the
Secretary of State ·(R. 7).
On .March 25, 1954, Teague, appearing specially,
moved the Court to quash the service of summons upon
the ground that he was not subject to service of process
under the provisions of Section 41-12-8, U. C.A., 1953, since
he \vas not a "non-resident" at the time of the alleged
accident. This motion was supported by the affidavit
of one of counsel for Teague, in which it was stated that
at the time of the alleged accident, Teague was a member.
of the Armed Forces of the United States, stationed
within the borders of the State of Utah, and had been
so stationed for many months prior to said date and
wa~ so stationed for 1nany months following the date of
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said accident and until the sununer of 1953, and that
at all times during that period defendant could be found
at Deseret Chemical Depot, Tooele County, Utah. (R. 14).
Brandon filed no counter affidavit. At the hearing
on the Motion, Brandon's counsel took the stand and testified, in substance, that he had made "diligent search
concerning Mr. Teague" and that he was not within
the state "at this time." This testimony was on April
20, 1954, more than six rrwnths after the complaint was
filed and twenty months after the accident. Counsel
also stated that, at smne date not specified, prior to
the filing of the complaint in the present matter, suit
was brought against the United States "in this matter"
and that Teague was not then within the State of Utah.
(R. 25 ).
I.t will be observed that this testimony does not contro¥ert the affidavit filed on behalf of Teague. The
testimony was directed to the proposition that, at the
time of the complaint, fourteen months after the acciden, Teague was not within the borders of Utah and had
a mailing address in another state. Exhibit P-1, a copy
of the State Police report, showed that the car bein~
driven by Teague had out-of-state license plates, although
the address of T-eague was given as Deseret Chemical
Depot, which is, of course, in Tooele County, Utah.
Despite the fact that no further showing was made
on behalf of Brandon, the District Court, on May 13,
1954, denied Teague's n1otion to quash.
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Teague thereupon filed his petition for intermediate
appeal to the Supreme Court of the Strute of Utah, Case
No. 8204, which petition was by this Court denied on
June 1, 1954. Teague thereafter commenced this original
proceeding by filing his complaint against Brandon and
the District Court of the Third Judicial District in and
for Salt Lake Oounty, State of Utah. Upon this complaint an alternative writ was issued by this Court on
July 21, 1954, and the record of proceedings before the
District Court was filed in this Court on October 19,
1954.
STATEMENT ·oF POINTS
THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH, IS PROCEEDING WITHOUT AND IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION IN THAT ACTION PENDING BEFORE IT,
ENTITLED MILTON C. BRANDON, PLAINTIFF VS.
HOWARD C. TEAGUE, DEFENDANT, CASE NO. 99973, IN
THAT THE COMPLETE RECORD OF THAT COURT FAILS
TO SHOW THAT How· ARD C. TEAGUE WAS A NON-RESIDENT OF UTAH AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT.

ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH, IS PROCEEDING WITHOUT AND IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION IN THAT ACTION PENDING BEFORE IT,
ENTITLED MILTON C. BRANDON, PLAINTIFF VS.
HOWARD C. TEAGUE, DEFENDANT, CASE NO. 99973, IN
THAT THE COMPLETE RECORD OF THAT COURT FAILS
TO SHOW THAT HOWARD C. TEAGUE WAS A NON-RESIDENT OF UTAH AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT.
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It vvill be obserYed from the lang1uage of the Utah
statute, quoted in the Statement of Facts, that it is the
"use and operation" of a n1,otor vehicle by a non-resident
which is construed as an "appointment by such nonresident" of the Secretary of State as his attorney on
'~'hom process may be served. Further, it is such "use
or operation'' which signifies the '' agree,Inent'' of the
non-resident tha1t such process shall have legal effect.
It is our contention that this statutory language is
susceptible of only one reasonable interpretation, namely,
that the term ''non-resident'' refers to the time of the
''use and operation'' of the vehicle, and not to the time
of the commencement of an action arising out of such
use and operation.
Our research discloses that simHar statutes have
been so construed by both Federal and State courts
and we have failed to find any case where the court has
adopted a contrary view.
The following eases support our position:
Fisher v. Terrell, et .al., (New Mexico, 1947) 187 P.
(2d) 387; DeFier, et ux. v. Maddox et .al., (Cal., 1948)
197 P. (2d) 87; Johnson v. Jacoby, (Ct. of App., Dist.
of Col., 1952) 195 F. (2d) 563; Wood v. White, 68 App.
D. C. 341, 97 F. (2d) 646 (1938), Certiorari denied, 304
U.S. 578; Clendening v. Fitterer, (Okla., 1953) 261 P.
(2d) 896; Red Top Cab~· Baggage Co. for Use and Benefit of Fountaine v. Iiolt, Judge, (Fla., 1944), 16 Southern
(2d) 649; N01rthwest JJfortgage and Secu.rity Co. v. Noel
Constnt.ction Co., (North Dakota, 1941), 300 N.W. 28;
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Roach v. Raupp, (Iowa, 1940), 289 N.W. 760; Warwick
Y. District Court of City and County of Denver, et al.,
(Col., 1954), 269 P. (2d) 704; Suit v. Shailer, et al., (D. C.,
D. l\fd., 1937), 18 F. Supp. 568; Colon et·al. v. Penn. Greyhound Lines, Inc., et a.Z., (New Jersey, 1953), 99 A. (2d)
181; Rontpza v. Lucas, et al., (Ill., 1949), 85 N.E. (2d)
467; Iiinten et al. v. Peter· et al., (Minn., 1952), 55 N.W.
(2d) 442; Way v. Turner, (Ga., 1950) 57 S.E. (2d) 439.
The rule has been stated in this language by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court:
''The statute does not apply to a motorist who
was a resident of the state at the time the accident occurred, although he thereafter leaves the
state and becomes a non-resident and is a nonresident at the time suit is brought.'' Clendenvng
v. Fitterer supra.
In Carlson v. District Cou'ff of City and County of
Denver, et al., (Colo., 1947), 180 P. (2d) 525, the court
had before it this statutory provision:
''The operati~on by a non-resident of a motor
vehicle on a public highway in this state shall be
dee·med equivalent to an appointment by such
non-resident of the secretary of state to be his
or its true and lawful attorney, upon whom may
be served all lawful civil processes in any actions
... ~owing out of any accident ... in which such
non-resident may be involved ... "

It was held that non-residence at the time of the
accident wa~ required for service of process under that
statute.
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In the case of J(rwrland v. Chernobil, et al., 260 New
York 254, 183 N.E. 380, the Court of Appeals clearly
indicated that the controlling faotor is the status of the
defendant at the ti1ne of the aecident. For many years,
the traffic laws of New York contained a provision allowing £or ·service of process upon a non-resident motorist in
language almost identical to the Utah statute. It was
apparently recognized by the New York Legislature that
the statute made no provision for serrvice upon a motorist
who was a resident of New York at the time of the
accident, but who subsequently, and before suit was filed,
became a non-resident, for the Legislature added a new
section to the code specifically covering that situation.
In the Kurland case, the accident happened before
the addition to the st~atute became effective. After its
effective date, the action was instituted against the defendant Lehman. In holding that the time of accident is the
critical time, :the Court said:
"When this defendant operated his car on
our highways, certainly he did not in fact agree
to vest the Secreta.ry of State with any power of
agency for the receipt of service of process. At
that time no presumption had been established,
for the presumption exists only by reason. of
statutory enactment, and no statute applicable to
persons of his class was then· effective.''
(Emphasis added)
In the case of lVood v. White, et al., supra, the United
States Court of Appeals £or the District of Columbia,
had before it for decision a question similar to that
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presentl~,

before this Court. The Circuit Court was
a;;kl'd to adopt an interpretation of the statute so that
the statute would read in effect:
''The operation by a non-resident (or by a
resident who shall have become a non-resident
at the time process is issued) shall be deemed an
appointment of a statutory agent for the service
of process.''
The Court, in rejecting this interpretation, stated
that this view would require the Court to hold that the
word "non-resident" actually means "resident." The
Court observed that this ''would go f,ar beyond any
reasonable process of legislative interpretation." Continuing, the Court observed that:
''Where a statute imposes a contractual
obligation in derogation of the com,mon law, and
affects substantial rights, it cannot be extended
by implication to include persons who do not
come within its terms, but instead must be strictly
construed.''
The Court concluded that:
"It is the non-resident, and the non-resident
only, who, by making use of the high ways, signifies
his agreement that substituted service may he
made upon him and that he does so only at the
time he uses the highways and only by the act of
operating a motor vehicle thereon."
An examination of decisi,ons reaching a contrary
result jndicates that in those jurisdictions ~a statute fundamentally djfferent from our Section 41-12-8, U.C.A., 1953,
was before the court. See for example, State ex rel
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Thompson v. Disbrict Cottrt of the Fourth Judicial District in and for Missoula County, et al., (Mont., 1939),
91 P. (2d) 422, where the statute provided:
''The operation by any person . . . of any
motor vehicle ... on any public way in this state,
shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by
such person of the secretary of state ... to ·be
h.i-s true and lawful attorney upon whom may be
served all lawful processes in any action . . .
g\rowing out of an accident ... in which he ...
may be involved while operating a motor vehicle
on any public way in this state ... " (Emphasis
added)
See also Sanders v. Paddock, (Ill., 1951) 97 N.E. (2d)
600, decided after amendment to the Illinois statute,
subsequent to the decision in Rompza v. Lucas, (Ill.,
1948), 85 N.E. (2d) 467.
\Vhen the Illinois and Montana statutes are closely
examined it is clear that decisions based upon such
statutes can have no force in the determination of a
proper ·interpretation of the Utah statute, since the
language is fundamentally different.
\Ye submit that on the basis of the cases hereinabove
cited and discussed, and on the basis of sound logic and
reasoning, the only proper conclusion is that a motorist
cannot be subject to service of process under the Utah
Non-Resident Motorist Statute, unless he was in fact
anon-resident at the time of his use of our highways.
With this rule in mind it becomes pertinent to
examine the record of the trial court to determine if
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there was 'a showing that Teague was a non-resident at
the time of the accident. Teague's special appearance
for the purpose of quashing the purported service of
summons upon him, constitut~d a 0hallenge to the jurisdiction of the court and the burden was thus thrust
upon Brandon to show that the tdal court was properly
exercising its jurisdiction.
It is a rule of general application that when jurisdiction is challenged the court's duty to inquire into
its right to entertain the procedure is imperative, and he
who invokes the court's power must show that he is
properly before it. See In re Pacific States Savings cy
Loan Company (D. C. Cal., 1939), 27 F. Supp. 1009.
This rule has been recognized and applied in several
cases involving non-resident motorist statutes in which
the defendant has attacked the jurisdiction of, the court
by motion to quash the service of sum·mons. In Carlson v.
District Court of City and County of Denver, et al., supra,
the defendant appeared specially and moved the Colorado
Supreme Court for an order quashing service of summons
upon him on the ground that he was a resident at the
time of the accident. The Court said:
"The motion to quash challenged the court's
jurisdiction and consequently the burden of proof
in the District Court was on Fodor (plaintiff
below) to establish by competent evidence all the
facts es·sential to the court's jurisdiction. One of
these essential facts in the instant case was the
non-residence of plaintiff here (defendant below)
at the time of the accident on December 4, 1944."
p. 530.
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A similar rule was adopted in Wanrick v. District
Court of Ci.ty and Coumty of Denver, (Colo., 1954), 269
P. (2d) 704, and Romp.za v. Lucas, et al., (Ill., 1949), 85
N.E. (2d) 467.
;

In Jerma.ine v. Graf, et a_l., (Iowa, 1939), 283 N.W.
428, one of the defendants moved to quash the service
of summons upon hiin on the ground that he was not a
''person'' within the meaning of the act. The Court s~aid:

'"'

~I

"'I'he special appearance was a direct attack.
The burden rested on plaintiff to sustain by
adequate showing the questioned jurisdiction

* * *"
Plaintiff's pleadingJs in the trial court contain only
one statement relative to the non-residence of the defenaant, Teague. It is alleged in. the complaint that Teague
"is a non-res~dent" (R. 3) (emphasis ours). This complaint was filed on October 2, 1953. The accident occurred
on August 8, 1952, according to plaintiff's complaint.
No statement is made as to defendant's residence at
that time. That time, however, is the critical time. Residence or non-re·sidence at the time of the commencement of the action is wholly immaterial. See Carlson v.
District Cottrt, supra, and Rompza v. Lucas, supra, where
the Illionis court in affirn1ing an order setting aside
a judgment said :
'' ... the affidavit is to the effect that the
defendants were non-residents eleven months
after the accident. It does not appear that they
were non-resjdents. on May 26, 1946 (the date of
the accident). ' '
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The pleadings of the plaintiff in the lower court
affirmatively show that Teague's last address was in
Tooele County, Utah. It cannot seriously be urged that
these ple'adings raise even a suggestion of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant.
Teague's motion to quash the service of summons
and the affidavit attached, state that he was not a nonresident at the time of the accident, having been stationed
within the borders of Utah as a member of the Armed
Forces of the United States for many months prior to
the date of the accident, August 8, 1952, and thereafter
until the summer of 1953. On the hearing upon the motion
the evidence showed that Teague was located within the
State of Utah until the summer of 1953. Mr. Dwight
King, attorney for Brandon, testified that Howard C.
Teague was not a resident of the State of Utah at the
time the complaint was filed. He ,also offered in evidence
a purported copy of a motor vehicle accident report.
Even if this report be considered competent evidencewhich it obviously is not-it added only one additional
fact. It showed only that the automobile owned and
driven by Teague carried 'a North Carolina license plate.
A similar showing as to the license plate was made
in Carlson v. District Court of City and Cownty of Denver
et al., supra. The Colorado Supreme Court said:
''If it should be held here that simply because
the automobile driven by plaintiff bore an Illinois
license rather than a Colorado license, we should
be obliged to hold the licensee to be a non-resi-
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dent, we ·would be adopting .an artificial, strained,
and unwarranted construction on the term 'nonresident.' '' p. 530.
In Johnson v. Jacoby, (Di~t. of Col. Court of
Appeals, 1952), 195 Fed. (2d) 563, plaintiff brought suit
to recover dmnages for personal injuries sustained on
April 24, 1945. The suit was filed on November 18, 1947.
J a0oby moved to quash the service on the ground that
he was not a non-resident, having left his home in N·ew
York to accept employment in the District of Columbia
and having actually lived in the District of Columbia
until January, 1946. The affidavit filed in opposition
to the motion to quash stated that Jacoby's automobile
bore New York license plates on the ·date of the accident.
The court said that although Jacoby may have been domiciled inN ew York on April 24, 1945, he ·actually resided in
the District of Colunrbia from December 31, 1943, until
January, 1946, and that there was nothing in the case
to indicate that Jacoby would not hwve been amenable
to service in the ordinary way at any time within eight
months after the accident. In affirming the order of the
lower court quashing the summons, the court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, said:
''In our view the statute was not intended to
reach an actual resident such as Jacoby was,
but was enacted to provide a ·means of bringing
before the local court a non-resident transient
motorist who is here today and gone tomorrow."
In Suit v. Sha,i.Zer, a Federal Case, supra, the plaintiff urged that the automobile being driven by the defendant was registered in California. In holding that this
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fact did not affect the question of residence, and in granting the rnotion to quash the service of summons, District
J udg;e Chesnut of the District Court for the District of
Maryland, said:
j

''The mischief which was intended to be
overcome by the statute was obviously the difficulty of effecting service of summons in the usual
way within the state on transient motorists or
non-residents who are only temporarily within the
state, 'but no such condition existed in this case
where the defendant was actually residing within
the state for two years before the wrong complained of and for more than a year thereafter.
There is nothing in this case to indicate that
she would not have been amenable to service of
summons in the ordinary way at any time within
a year after. the accident, and indeed it appears
that she could not in fact have effectively been
sued elsewhere than in Maryland during that
period.'' p. 571.
The basis of jurisdiction in personam over non-resident motorists under the Utah statute is not operation of
an automobile bearing an out-of-state license. It is "the
use and operation" by a non-resident of an automobile
upon the highways of Utah. Residence of the driver, not
registration of the automobile is the test.
In Chapman v~ Daf/Jis, (Minn., 1951), 45 N.W. (2d)
822, the court said in affirming an order quashing service
of summons:
"The mischief which was intended to be
rmnedied ... was the difficulty of effecting service
of sumnwns in the usual way within the state on
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non-residents who were only temporarily within
the state. But no such eondition existed in this
case, where defendant ·was actually residing within
the state for almost a year after the alleged accident." p. 827.

,·Jr

In the instant case it is clear that from the time
of the accident on August 8, 1952, until the late summer
of 1953, the defendant below was subject to service of
process at the Deseret Chemical Depot, Tooele County,
Utah, under Section 63-8-1, U.C.A., 1953, which provides
for the service of process upon lands acquired by the
United States for Military or Naval purposes. And
under the decision of Booth v. Crockett, District Judge,
et al., 110 Utah 336; 173 P. (2d) 647 (1946), the def·endant
below would not hruve been subject to service of process
at any other place.

':m

In that case the evidence showed that Frank Fairbanks went to the U.S. Naval Training Depot at San
Diego, California on December 5, 1945. A summons was
left with his mother at the Fairbanks home on December
13, 1945. The defendant moved to quash the service of
summons on· the ground that the Fairbanks home was
not ''the usual place of abode'' of Frank Fairbanks. The
motion was granted. On appeal, the Supreme Court,
citing [{ urilla v. Roth, 132 N.J.L. 213; 38 A. (2d) 862
(1944) said :
'' 'Abode' is one's fixed place of residence
for the time being-the place where a person
dwells. One':-; usual place of 'abode' in the statutory view, is the place where one is 'actually
Jiving' at the time when service is made." p. 368.
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In a recent New Jersey decision the court defined
''resident'' in terms of ''usual place of abode.'' The
Court said:
''In my opinion the word 'resident' is to be
taken to refer to a person who has a dwelling
house or usual place of abode-at which a summons can be served." Colon et al v. Penn. Greyhound Lines, Inc., et al., (N. J., 1953) 99 A. (2d)
181, 182.
The domicile of the
may have been elsewhere
"residence," however, as
resident motorist statute,
Tooele County, Utah.

defendant in the case below
than the State of Utah. His
that term is used in the nonwas Deseret Chemical Depot,

As was said by the Supre1ne Court of Colorado in
Carlson v. District Court of City and County of Denve.r,
et al., s·upra :
''The distinction between mere residence and
domicile must be borne in ·mind. The former is
used in law to denote that a person dwells in a
given place; the latter is the local home of the
person, or that place where the law presumes that
he has the intention of permanently residing,
although he may be absent from it. * * *
"The term non-resident as used in our
statutes should be so construed as to make it consistent with the purpose of the Act. It is obvious that the Legislature intended to obviate the
difficulty presented in effecting service of process
in the usual and ordinary way within the State
of Colorado on non-residents, who were temporarily within the state, and who, while here, became
involved in an auto accident on a public highway.
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In the instant case no such difficulty presented
itself for plaintiff was actually living and residing
in Leadville, Colorado, with his family for a
period of more than five rnonths after the accident, and there is nothing in the record disclosing
any reason why service could not have been
effectuated during this time.'' pp. 529-30.
The Utah noB-resident motorist statute should be
construed in the light of the objectives for which it was
enacted. The construction placed upon the Colorado
statute in the Carlson Case, Supra, well serves the intention of the Le~slature in enacting this method of obtaining jur~sdiction in personam of non-resident motorists
who are here today and gone tomorrow, and who accordingly cannot be served hy process in the usual fashion.
Section 41-12-8, U.C.A., 1953, should be given a
construction consistent with the other methods of service
of process provided by statute. In the Booth case, supra,
the Supreme Court of Utah held that a member of the
United States Navy stationed at the Naval Training
Depot at San Diego, California, did not have his usual
place of abode at his parents' home. His abode was construed to be his residence for the time being. He could
not, therefore, be served with process by leaving a copy
of that process at his parents' home. If the plaintiff in
that action had sought service under the provisions of the
non-resident n1otorist statute, this court would surely have
held that Fairbanks, having a usual place of abode in
Californi·a, where he was then residing, was a non-resident of the State of Utah at that tin1e. Any other
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result would have precluded the plaintiff from obtaining
of process in any way, contrary to the purposes
for the enactment of the non-resident motorist statute.
~ervice

The defendant in this case had a usual place of
abode in Tooele County, Utah; that is where he was, at
that time, residing. He was a non-resident at that time of
the state where he had lived prior to his induction, but
was a resident of the State of Utah.

l

i

i'
I'
I

CONCLUSION
By this extraordinary proceedingt we have urged
that this court cons~der and decide this question of jurisdiction because it is a question which, under modern
travel and living conditions, will recur again and again.
\V e perceive no real difficulty in determining a
proper construction of the statute when the plain and
clear meaning of the statutory words is realized. It is
"the use and operation" of a vehicle which gives rise
to the appointment of the Secretary of State as the
agent for service of process. It is the "use or operation"
which signifies the agreement that the process so served,
shall have full legal force and effect. Obviously the
appointment of a process agent and the signification of
agreement occur at the time of the use or operation.
There is no appointment, nor is there si.~ification of
agree,ment until that time, but as soon as the use of the
highway is made by the operation of a motor vehicle,
the appointment and agreement spring into life.
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Since the use and the operation are the determining
f'actors, the status of the person who is deemed to have
made the appointment and to have signified his a~ree
n1ent, must be determined conten1poraneously with such
use and operation. There "\vas never any showing, either
by Brandon or by inferences from the whole record,
that Te'ague was a non-resident ~of Utah at the time
of the accident.
Since the statute is in derogation of common-law
rights, and ought to be strictly construed, it is earnestly
submitted that the defendant District Court should be
restrained from proceeding further with the action now
pending before it, and the temporary writ ought to be
made permanent.
Respectfully suh1nitted,
SKEEN, THURMAN, WORSLEY &
SNOW andH. G. CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff,

1501 Walker Bank Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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